Black Box Recorder

Analysis of the Rantissi assassination attempt and the road map

Ha'aretz carries an interesting analysis of the failed assassination attempt and the "road map". Among other things, it points out that the Israeli leadership wished to make an "example" of Rantissi, even though he was not what the Israeli government calls a "ticking bomb". It also discusses the formulation of the "road map" and the understandings reached between the US and Israel that leave little room for Palestinian input other than a signature on the dotted line:

The first draft of the road map was presented to Israel on October 14, 2002, after having been discussed with the U.S. in a more limited forum, and the second draft was submitted on December 20 (also after some secret meetings with a smaller group of Israeli officials). The exact wording of both drafts was not revealed to the ministers even after they were completed.

The meetings of the inter-ministerial panel led to the 14 comments that Israel sought to insert into the final draft of the document. This objective was not achieved because of Tony Blair...
...
This constraint prevented the inclusion of Israel's 14 comments, but the alternative procedure that was adopted - government approval of the road map with the 14 comments - was enough to satisfy Sharon. As he sees it, his government approved the Israeli version of the road map and the White House was quick to praise this development. It was no coincidence when, at Aqaba last week, Sharon announced: "We accept the road map as it was adopted by the government of Israel."
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Behind the public outline is a series of understandings with the American administration: A final status accord will require Israel to withdraw, but not to the 1967 lines; Israel will not be obliged to absorb a single Palestinian refugee; the currency, customs and telephone systems of the Palestinian state will be established in parallel with those systems in Israel. As far as the interim accord, Jerusalem and Washington agree that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized; that it will have a police force but not an army (the caliber of the weapons that its officers will carry has also been determined); that Israel will have control over the airspace and broadcast space of the Palestinian state and over its points of entry.

In other words, the future Palestinian "state" will bear no resemblance to what is commonly understood by the word "state" in the English language. In reality, it will be much closer to a South African township or an American India reservation.

Israel's supporters should ask themselves why the Palestinians would ever accept something like this. Why should they sign an agreement that will legally enshrine their inferior status? Why shouldn't they simply wait until they are the majority in Palestine and then demand "one person, one vote" elections?

Meanwhile, the council of rabbis representing settlers in the West Bank issued a statement calling on "Arab countries to grant Palestinians in the territories 'the right of return to Arab lands,' and urged Israel to implement a biblical injunction against allowing non-Jews to settle in the Land of Israel."